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I. INTRODUCTION 
The one hundredth anniversary of the Kyoto University Faculty of 
Law is the kind of splendid occasion when, as Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes remarked, a distinguished institution "becomes conscious of itself 
and its meaning."1 I can hardly express my pleasure at being invited to 
join in your celebration; but I must express my fear that I can add little to 
it. When Dean Tanaka kindly invited me, I should probably have 
declined, for I, a foreigner, can hardly know enough about an institution so 
central to the life of its country and its profession to speak of it and its 
meaning. But you have done me the honor and given me the pleasure of 
allowing me to teach at Kyoto several times, and I welcomed the 
opportunity to thank you by addressing you. 
A faculty as eminent as this one constantly renews and even 
reinvents itself. Today, that renewal and reinvention come at a 
momentous time: Your country's achievements in so many fields have 
now made it useful to reconsider the kind of legal education that will serve 
you best. Probably no nation has ever been so deliberate and so 
cosmopolitan in shaping its institutions. When it decides to reconsider an 
institution, Japan characteristically surveys similar institutions throughout 
the world, takes their fmest elements, and combines them in the blend that 
Keynote Address, Symposium in Honor of the IOOth Anniversary of the Kyoto 
University Faculty of Law, July 3, 1999. 
** Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal Medicine, 
University of Michigan. I am grateful to Atsushi Kinami, Shigeaki Tanaka, and Mark 
West for the thoughtful advice they have given me while I have worked on this talk and 
to Atsushi Kinami for his valiant labors in translating it. 
1 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Address at the Brown University Commencement 
(1897), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS, 1920 at 164. 
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best suits Japan. No doubt this is how you will reconsider Japanese legal 
education. 
It thus seemed to me that I might best contribute to your festivities 
by describing and explaining one of the systems of legal education you 
may wish to scrutinize-my own. 2 My goal is not to convince you to 
adopt the American scheme of legal education. You will know better than 
I what you want. However, although Japan may not be an "ordinary" 
country, in legal education it is America that is unusual. We differ in 
several crucial respects from most of the world. I want to justify our 
anomaly. 
II. THE GOALS OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
American legal education is preeminently shaped by its desire to 
produce a particular kind of lawyer. Americans see law as a social tool. 
Law, to us, is not primarily a system of principles; it is a set of rules and 
powers that can be used to improve society. This leads us particularly to 
want three things in our lawyers. 
First, we want lawyers who can solve their client's problems. We 
think lawyers vitally help structure commercial relations and make them 
operate smoothly. This means lawyers must work adeptly in a complex 
industrialized society which relies extensively on law as an organizing 
institution. To do so throughout their careers, they must be able to adapt 
flexibly and acutely to the rapidly changing circumstances of such a 
society. True in asking lawyers to help clients get what they want, we 
give up some of the advantages of asking lawyers to help control their 
clients. However, we are loath to see lawyers become petty bureaucrats 
whose habitual sentence is, "You can't do that, it isn't covered by the 
rules." 
In short, as Karl Llewellyn once said, the essence of the lawyer's 
craftsmanship lies in skills, and wisdoms: in practical, 
effective, persuasive, inventive skills for getting things 
done, any kind of thing in any field; in wisdom and 
judgment in selecting the things to get done; in skills for 
moving men into desired action, any kind of man, in any 
field; and then in skills for regularizing the results, for 
building into controlled large- scale action such doing of 
things and such moving of men. Our game is essentially 
the game of planning and organizing management (not of 
2 Indeed, that scrutiny has already begun, and very thoughtfully and astutely. 
See, e.g., Koji Sato, Professional Legal Education and Professional School, IDE-
GENDAI NO KOTO KYOIKU [HIGHER EDUCATION TODAY], Nov. 1998, at 23. 
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runmng it), except that we concentrate on the areas of 
conflict, tension, friction, trouble, doubt-and in those 
areas we have the skills for working out results. 3 
All this means that, second, we want lawyers who are creative. 
Lawyers should help invent new forms of commercial endeavor, imagine 
new ways of structuring deals between commercial enterprises to meet 
their needs, and devise ingenious ways to help companies work flexibly 
within a system of governmental regulation that must always threaten to 
ossify. We also want lawyers to fashion new social and governmental 
forms. Lawyers representing clients and working for the government do 
and should often envisage new ways to shape and stir government's 
authority. 
Lawyers of this kind need a third quality. They must be masters of 
legal analysis. They need critical minds, to see the flaws in any argument. 
They need agile minds, to construct a compelling argument from the 
myriad sources on which lawyers draw. They need insightful minds, to 
clothe the bare bones of legal logic with the sinew of social practicality. 
This, then, is the lawyer we seek. How do we try to produce him? 
III. HOW THE GOALS OF AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION 
SHAPE ITS MEANS 
I said that American legal education differs in numerous ways 
from the legal education of almost every other country. These anomalies, 
I think, grow out of our vision of the lawyer we want. Let me first sketch 
the structure of American legal education and then explain how it differs 
from legal education in other nations. 
The young American who wishes to become a lawyer must first 
attend a university for four years. There he may study any topic except 
law, which is not an undergraduate subject. He then takes an examination 
(called the Law School Admission Test) which measures his aptitude for 
learning law. He then applies to law schools, which base their decision on 
that aptitude, on his college grades, and on whether his qualities and 
expenence promise to make him a rewarding student and a capable 
lawyer. 
He then studies law for three years. In his first year, he takes 
required courses on the building blocks of the common law-property, 
torts, criminal law, and contracts-and on civil procedure and 
constitutional law. In his second and third years, he may choose his own 
courses, although he usually takes courses in corporate law, commercial 
3 K. N. Llewellyn, The Crafts of Law Re-Valued, 15 ROCKY MOUNT. L. REV. 1, 
3 (1942). 
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law, tax, evidence, and constitutional law. In the summer after his second 
year, he ordinarily works for a law firm, both for the high salary and the 
experience. In the summer after he graduates, he spends a few weeks 
taking a commercial course which prepares him for the bar examination of 
the state in which he hopes to practice. 
This sketch conceals the first difference between America's and 
most other countries' legal education. It lies in what American schools try 
to teach. Prospective lawyers need to learn three things: ( 1) legal 
doctrine, or what the law says, (2) legal analysis, or how to reason about a 
legal issue, and (3) legal practice, or how to apply legal doctrine and legal 
reasoning to the lawyers' tasks. In no country with which I am familiar do 
the law schools attempt to teach the practice of law. Rather, that task is 
primarily left-expressly or tacitly-to some other institution: in England, 
to apprenticeship combined with instruction provided by the two parts of 
the organized profession (barristers and solicitors); in Germany, to the 
Referendariat, a series of apprenticeships in different practice settings; in 
Japan, to classes at the Legal Training and Research Institute and to 
apprenticeships. 
The American system is perhaps the least formalized. Essentially, 
American law schools expect preparation for legal practice to come from 
informal apprenticeships in law firms. American schools do generally 
have some "clinical" courses in which students represent clients (usually 
poor people who cannot afford to pay a lawyer) under supervision. 
However, the specialization of American lawyers means that clinical 
training cannot equip students for all the kinds of practice they will 
undertake. In particular, the more prestigious the law school, the likelier 
its students are to go to large firms that represent corporate clients and the 
likelier tre school is to rely on those fmns to give their graduates the 
specialized apprenticeships they need. 
This worldwide division of labor seems to me entirely sensible. 
Much about the practice of law is best learned while working in company 
with experienced lawyers. It is inefficient to try to teach it in law school. 
No law school should hope to tum out finished lawyers. 
Legal education around the world agrees, then, in leaving practical 
training to practical people in practical settings. Where America stands 
almost alone is in its view of the other two components of legal training. 
American law schools do not primarily seek to inculcate a thorough 
command of "the law." Rather they principally seek to teach students to 
"think like a lawyer." Of course Pmerican law schools teach a good deal 
of doctrine, and of course schools around the world expect their students 
to learn something of how lawyers think. But in my experience American 
law schools are so much less ambitious to teach doctrine and so much 
more determined to teach reasoning that American legal education differs 
notably from its foreign counterparts. 
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Our approach works partly because it is impossible-at least in the 
United States-to teach students all the law they will need. The difficulty 
of teaching everything is particularly acute in a federal system with more 
than fifty jurisdictions and in a country as law-rich as the United States. 
What is more, the practice of law is ever more specialized. We do not 
know what specialty any given student will pursue. And neither does he, 
since specialties change over time, as new fields open up and clients' 
needs change. To teach the student everything is to teach him much he 
will not use and much that will soon be outdated. In sum, as my 
distinguished American predecessor in Japan, Walter Gellhorn, wrote, 
American legal scholars . . . believe with Alfred North 
Whitehead that information decays as quickly as fish. 
Students may learn a lot of details their professor has laid 
before them, but the details are likely to be forgotten very 
soon after they have been disgorged during the 
examination. . . . [I]f anything at all is to be left, it will have 
to be some heightened capacity, some ability to deal with 
new experience, rather than merely to recount an old 
expenence. That is why the case system of instruction 
places such heavy emphasis upon method instead of 
content.4 
Our discussion of what law school should teach leads us to the 
second distinctive feature of American legal education - how professors 
teach. Put briefly, Americans prefer Socratic discussions to lectures. I 
believe this is as crucial a feature of American legal education as any 
other, and perhaps the feature best suited for export. But what does 
"teaching Socratically" mean? Today, the Socratic method is used in 
many ways, but at its core is the idea that the professor best spends class 
time by leading a probing discussion, not by lecturing. 5 
In its purest form, the Socratic method means teaching students the 
law through class discussions of a series of cases. The professor proposes 
questions that force students to think hard about a case and the court's 
treatment of it. What were the facts of the case? What legal issues did the 
court actually resolve? What was the structure of the court's reasoning? 
What were the flaws of that reasoning? How could the legal issues be 
analyzed better? As the discussion develops, the professor challenges 
4 Walter Gellhorn, Impressions of Japanese Legal Training, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 
1239, 1241 (1958). 
5 I have described and defended the Socratic method in Carl E. Schneider, The 
Socratic Method and the Goals of Legal Education: With Some Thoughts Inspired by 
Travel, HOGAKU KYOSHITSU, Sept. 1995, at 34. 
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students to see the connections between the case's technical, doctrinal 
arguments and the broader social and philosophical principles that 
undergird them. He also tries to show students the recurring features of 
legal reasoning, to get them to see what makes a good argument and what 
makes a bad one. 
I believe that teaching Socratically in some form is necessary for 
accomplishing the goals of our system of legal education and perhaps the 
goals of any system of legal education. I have two reasons. The first is 
crude but vital: students need immediate and not just long-term incentives 
to work hard. As one of my own law teachers wrote, "to acquire 
discipline in any area of human endeavor is, in some degree, against 
nature."6 The universal problem of motivation is perhaps intensified in 
German and Japanese legal education, because students see so little reason 
to work for the university-German students because they rely on a 
Repetitur (a commercial tutor) to prepare them for examinations and 
Japanese students because they know they can get a job without stellar 
work in the university. 
To be sure, the best way of motivating students is to make 
education irresistibly stimulating. This is one reason the American law 
school seeks to broaden and deepen legal education by going beyond legal 
doctrine, by examining social policy writ large, and by recruiting the 
insights of many disciplines. But we also favor the Socratic method 
exactly because it makes class more stimulating. Socratic teaching makes 
the study of law demanding; it sets high standards of analytic effort and 
acuity. That which is easy is often boring; that which is rigorous is at least 
challenging. In addition, Socratic teaching asks students to awaken from 
their torpor, to speak and to help shape the discussion, to hear from their 
colleagues as well as their professor. 
Still, stimulation alone is rarely enough to inspire students to 
unremitting diligence. Socratic teaching gives students the incentive to 
prepare every day-the gratification of success, the embarrassment of 
failure. 
The second reason the Socratic method is vital to American legal 
education is that it is the best way of teaching a student to think like a 
lawyer. And not just like a lawyer, but like the kind of lawyer we think 
we want-analytically keen, problem-solving, creative. Let me try to 
explain why. 
Socratic teaching produces analytically keen lawyers because it 
makes students practice reasoning. You can no more teach someone to 
think by telling him how than you can teach him to play baseball by telling 
him how: both activities are too complex. Neither can you teach him to 
6 FRANCIS A. ALLEN, LAW, INTELLECT, AND EDUCATION 4-5 (1979). 
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reason by showing him how, since he will not appreciate what is difficult 
about the demonstration or detect how the argument was developed. 
Indeed, studies of how professionals reason suggest that they are so 
accustomed to using shortcuts in reasoning that mere demonstrations and 
even explanations of their thinking only confuse novices. "[C]ompetent 
practitioners usually know more than they can say. They exhibit a kind of 
knowing-in-practice, most of which is tacit."7 
In short, the only way people learn to reason well is by practicing 
assiduously. Socratic teaching gives students that practice-day after day 
for three years-by making them think like a lawyer under the guidance of 
an experienced legal analyst. Each class is an exercise in building and 
criticizing legal arguments by grappling with the hardest questions the 
legal system presents. The professor shows students what a good question 
is by requiring them to answer one and shows them what a good answer is 
by asking more questions about it. Gradually, students acquire a feel for 
what kinds of arguments work and a distaste for arguments that do not. 
Furthermore, this process teaches students to teach themselves. 
Students quickly learn to ask themselves the same questions they are 
asked in class. And because the professor provides no definitive answers 
to most of his questions, students are left to wonder and to ponder. 
Socratic teaching not only teaches reasoning; it also inculcates the 
habit of solving problems by constantly presenting students with problems 
to address and asking the entire class to demonstrate how many good 
solutions can be discovered. In like manner, the Socratic method teaches 
creativity. Students must find an argument even when that seems 
desperately difficult. They are insistently encouraged to ask why things 
are as they are and whether they might not be better arranged. 
The third distinctive feature of American legal education is that it 
is graduate education. This too helps produce the kind of keen and 
creative lawyers we seek. This is partly because law schools need not give 
students a broad education. That was the responsibility of their 
undergraduate training. Law schools are free to train lawyers. 
In addition, more can be demanded of graduate than undergraduate 
students. As an English observer remarks, "American law schools are 
blessed, in comparison with those in England or on the continent of 
Europe, in having a graduate student body that enables them to teach with 
a rigor and sophistication that might be unproductive with 
undergraduates."8 First, our students are older than undergraduates and 
7 
DONALD A. SCHON, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER: HOW PROFESSIONALS 
THINK IN ACTION viii (1983). To like effect is GARY KLEIN, SOURCES OF POWER: HOW 
PEOPLE MAKE DECISIONS (1998). 
8 Graham Hughes, The Great American Legal Scholarship Bazaar, 33 J. OF 
LEGAL ED. 424, 424-25 ( 1983). 
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thus tend to be more serious about their work. Second, they are more 
widely educated and are often trained in fields crucial to law, like 
economics and business. Third, they often have some experience with the 
world, since many of them have had a job between college and law school, 
or even during college. Law is about how the world works; the more 
students understand of that, the better. 
In sum, then, American legal education attempts to train lawyers 
who are skilled legal analysts, who are practiced problem-solvers, and 
who are habitually creative. We seek to do so through a program of 
graduate legal education that makes thinking like a lawyer its over-riding 
goal and that uses the Socratic method to achieve it. 
IV. CAN AMERICAN LEGAL EDUCATION BE ADAPTED TO 
JAPAN? 
You will of course decide for yourselves whether there is anything 
in American legal education worth adapting. You may wonder, for 
example, whether Japan has the same goals for lawyers as the United 
States. You may believe teaching the substance of the law is a more 
useful enterprise in Japan than in America. You may think the Socratic 
method produces lawyers too aggressive for life in a harmonious society. 
These are substantial questions I can hardly address, except perhaps to 
note that in a global world, Japanese lawyers will probably find it useful to 
be able to deal with lawyers trained in this way. But these are questions I 
leave to your good judgment. Here, I want to ask whether the practices I 
described can be imported into Japan. 
Making legal education graduate education is in one sense easy, 
since it can be done by fiat. On the other hand, such restructuring would 
raise political perplexities, including questions about whether you want 
your bar to remain small and elite. In any event, I believe the crucial issue 
is not when lawyers are trained, but how. For the core strength of 
American legal education is that it uses the Socratic method to teach 
students to become lawyers who think rigorously, constructively, and 
creatively. 
So, can law be taught Socratically in Japan? I see some reasons for 
concern, but more reasons for hope. First, there are surely cultural 
barriers. Not least of these are your culture's inhibitions against some 
manifestations of disagreement. Professor Gellhom commented on this 
some years ago: 
The non-argumentativeness of Japanese young people-
and, indeed, many older people-is very noticeable to a 
foreign teacher, perhaps especially to a law teacher. The 
law, it has been said, is a disputatious profession. Even 
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neophytes in that profession, in American law schools, fmd 
that argument comes naturally-not rancorous debate, but 
the thrust and counterthrust of contesting opinions. They 
sharpen not merely their tongues but their wits by constant 
exchange of views, disagreement, reconciliation of 
seemingly inconsistent ideas. In Japan, on the contrary, it 
seems to me that differences are often kept under tight 
constraint instead of being brought out into the open. 9 
The challenge is not only to get Japanese students to argue with each 
other; it is also to persuade them to discourse with the professor. In good 
Socratic teaching, the professor confronts the students with arguments and 
ideas and expects them to scrutinize his own arguments and ideas 
critically. 10 In Japan (and Germany), however, respect for age and rank 
operate so imperatively that, in my observation, students shrink from this 
kind of interchange. 
These cultural factors surely inhibit Socratic teaching in Japan, but 
I am not convinced that they prohibit it. The classes I observed at the 
Legal Training and Research Institute were taught Socratically in ways 
both students and professor seemed to enjoy. I myself have taught 
Socratically in Japan a number of times. I hesitate to draw strong 
conclusions from this, since my students chose to take courses from an 
American. On the other hand, my teaching faced an unusual obstacle-! 
taught in English. In any event, my Japanese students respond to Socratic 
teaching much as my German students do. They are diffident at first but 
soon enter gaily into the spirit of the enterprise. By the end of our time 
together, they express warm-hearted appreciation for a method of teaching 
which they find lively, engaging, and invigorating and which they think 
expresses the professor's solicitude for their learning. 
You might also object to the idea of teaching Socratically in Japan 
because Americans use it primarily to teach how to think like a lawyer, 
while Japanese might wish to emphasize the substance of the law. It is 
true that Socratic teachers do not try to cover all of a course's subject in 
class. Rather, they emphasize its most challenging aspects and rely on 
students to learn the easy parts on their own. As one American professor 
9 Walter Gellhorn, Impressions of Japanese Legal Training, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 
1239, 1250 (1958). 
10 One distinguished American sociologist who was trained as a lawyer even 
believed that "the law student is encouraged, in part of course by forensic tradition, to 
talk back to his professors, even in huge classes, with a verve and lack of fear of what 
might happen to him that one seldom finds in graduate school." David Riesman, Law 
and Sociology: Recruitment, Training and Colleagues hip, 9 STAN. L. REV. 643, 648 
(1957). 
On American Legal Education 85 
writes, our method "places the student on a narrow, knife-edge ridge of 
conflicting doctrine, enabling a ready survey of the doctrinal landscape on 
either side below."11 What is more, the Socratic rrethod spurs students to 
work hard at the sometimes wearisome task of learning the substance of 
the law, and it reveals to the professor what progress they are making and 
where they need help. 
Another reason to be skeptical about teaching Socratically in Japan 
is that Socratic teaching is easiest when there is a case to discuss. Civil 
law systems, of course, rely less centrally than ours on cases. However, 
even civil law jurisdictions have cases, and statutes can readily be taught 
by inventing cases that pose illuminating problems about interpreting a 
statute. The most efficient solution to this problem lies in publishing 
teaching materials that reprint judicial opinions, devise hypothetical cases, 
and set problems for students to work out and questions to reflect on. 
Such materials are already being developed in Japan. For example, one of 
the leading works on commercial law is a casebook by Professors Tatsuta 
and Takeuchi. 
There are also practical barriers to teaching Socratically in Japan. 
Japanese classes can be large (although not as large as many German 
classes). However, you can teach Socratically in classes of even two 
hundred students in a room with good acoustics. It is preferable to have 
classes small enough that each student is called on frequently. But even a 
student who is not speaking can learn much from a Socratic dialog by 
listening and trying to answer each question in his mind. And large 
classes have the advantage of offering many well-prepared students with 
differing opinions. 
Japanese professors might also reasonably say that they already 
bear heavy teaching loads and that Socratic teaching requires more labor 
than lectures. This is true. As long as the law does not change, you need 
only write a lecture once. But to lead a discussion, you need to be 
prepared to ask pertinent and probing questions no matter where the 
conversation may go. On the other hand, it is easier to teach well 
Socratically than by lecturing. As I once wrote, 
A good lecture is a thing of beauty and a joy forever, but it 
is painfully hard to craft. Leading a good discussion 
certainly requires considerable preparation beforehand, 
considerable attention at the time, and considerable 
evaluation afterward. But because it asks students to learn 
by doing, because it corrects errors and rewards insights, 
11 George L. Priest, The Growth of Interdisciplinary Research and the 
Industrial Structure of the Production of Legal Ideas: A Reply to Judge Edwards, 91 
MICH. L. REV. 1929, 1936 (1993). 
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because it challenges students to react and reflect, because 
it more deeply engages the minds of the students, and 
because it draws them into the work of learning and thus 
induces them to learn more richly and deeply, it commonly 
repays-and thus invites-pedagogical effort better than 
lecturing. 1 2 
Socratic teaching offers the professor another recompense. It is boring to 
lecture year after year on the same topic. But Socratic discussions can be 
actively interesting, since the professor never knows just what his students 
will say and thus where the discussion might lead. 
If a school asks its professors to teach Socratically, it needs to 
reward the effort that method exacts. The school could make teaching a 
criterion for hiring, promotion, and setting salaries. But this might be 
awkward in the Japanese system. Indeed, it is awkward in the American 
system. Fortunately, it is not necessary. In the United States, an informal 
culture (and excellent support services for professors) crucially sustains 
teaching. To invoke yet again my eminent predecessor, Professor 
Gellhom, 
American law professors think of themselves, very 
seriously, as teachers. Obviously, every professor 
everywhere, is a teacher. But those who have studied in 
Europe (from which so much Japanese academic tradition 
has been derived) will, I think, agree that the continental 
professors do not concentrate very much on their students. 
They study, they write, they lecture-and thus they teach. 
The professor functions in a professor-oriented rather than 
a student-oriented atmosphere, and he has few direct 
obligations to the learners who sit at his feet. 13 
Because Socratic teaching is so central to an American lawyer's 
education, American law professors inherit a tradition which commands 
them to labor at their teaching and which leads them to evaluate their 
colleagues and themselves partly on that basis. 
There is a fmal barrier not just to adopting the Socratic method, but 
to most reforms of legal education tlroughout most of the world. 
Japanese law professors, like legal academics in all the countries I have 
visited, lack authority over their schools which American professors have 
12 Carl Schneider, The Frail Old Age of the Socratic Method, 37 LAW 
QUADRANGLE NOTES 40 (1994). 
13 Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 1240. 
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found vital. 14 In particular, American professors-unlike professors in 
civil law systems-have two kinds of power. 
First, they can decide who will be admitted to their school. They 
exercise this power to select students with an aptitude for the study of law. 
Most law faculties around the world cannot do this. The Kyodai and 
Todai entrance exams, as I understand them, measure what the student 
learned in high school, not what he can learn of law. As Gellhom puts it, 
"The better universities' tests . . . afford an accurate insight into a 
student's capacity to absorb and retain information. They do not explore 
his ability to use the information he has. He is not pressed to exhibit his 
powers of analysis so much as his powers of recollection."15 
Second, American professors have the power to motivate. 
American law firms evaluate a prospective employee by examining the 
grades his professors gave him. Professors may give students who 
perform badly in class a bad grade. Students with bad grades will not get 
good jobs. This gives American students an incentive to prepare for class 
and to join in discussion. In contrast, Japanese students who have been 
admitted to an institution as eminent as yours have already taken the most 
important step toward getting good jobs. The few students who wish to 
become bengoshi rely principally on a commercial course to prepare them 
for the entrance examination for the Legal Training and Research Institute. 
How then, can professors induce them to do the burdensome work of 
preparing for and participating in class? 
I suspect that if Japanese and European law schools are to acquire 
authority over their own houses they will need to cabin the power of the 
state. American governments are ordinarily indifferent to what happens in 
law schools. Even public law schools rarely find public bodies meddling 
in their operations. In Japan and Europe, however, the ministries of 
education and justice generally not only set educational policy, but also 
insinuate themselves into the daily working of law schools in ways which 
must hobble law professors in the work of building great universities.16 
V. CONCLUSION 
Today, I have sought to explain the world's most anomalous 
system of legal education-my own. My defense has been that our system 
14 I have explored this point in some detail in Schneider, supra note 5. 
15 Gellhorn, supra note 9, at 1249. 
16 In Europe, this intrusion can go as far as bureaucratic participation in the 
selection of faculty. See Ugo Mattei & P. G. Monateri, Foreword: The Faces of 
Academia, 41 AM. J. OF COMP. L 351, 351-52 (1993); Bernard Rudden, Selecting Minds: 
An Afterword, 41 AM. J. OF COMP. L. 481 (1993). 
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works well to train the kind of lawyers we think we want: lawyers who 
are analytically able, who are adept at solving their clients' problems, who 
are creative. We try to produce them by teaching our students to think like 
lawyers. We do so first by making legal education graduate education. 
But more importantly, we do so by teaching Socratically, by making each 
class an opportunity for students to practice the language of the law until 
they become gifted speakers. I have acknowledged the barriers to 
implementing our system in your country, but I have argued that those 
barriers are not insuperable. 
You will, of course, be the soundest judges of whether any part of 
my system might interest you as you re-examine yours. You already have 
high reason to be satisfied with your system: After all, it has produced 
scholars and lawyers as distinguished as the ones before me now. Altering 
a successful system is always a perilous enterprise that demands 
persuasive reasons. But let me close by suggesting one: I believe that we 
American law professors and our students have more fun than our 
counterparts around the world. For us, every class is an adventure on 
which we embark together into a disciplined, rigorous, and inspiriting 
inquiry into some of the worthiest questions human beings can ask 
themselves. What more could we want? 
